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1.

The issues presented here concern the validity

of state taxation of (1) cigarette sales by members of certain
Indian tribes to Indians and non-Indians on the reservation,
and (2) the personal property of Indians who reside on the
reservation, including their automobiles.

Also drawn into

question is the power of the United States District Court
to enjoin the enforcement of the state tax laws in light of
the general prohibition against such injunctions contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
2.

Facts and Opinions Below:

The Flathead Indian

Reservation, created by the Treaty of Hell Gate of 1855,
12 Stat. 975, consists of approximately 1,245,000 acres, of
which approximately 628,642 acres are owned in fee, some
by Indians and some by non-Indians, 628,311 acres are held
in trust for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes
or individual Indians, and 1,017 acres are owned by the
United States.

The Reservation is located in Montana.

Tribal members comprise 19% of the total Reservation population.

There are farms, ranches, and communities scattered

throughout the inhabited portions of the Reservation.

All

services provided by the state and local governments are
equally available to Indians and non-Indians.

The state

operates the only schools on the Reservation.

A system of

streets, county roads, and state highways has also been
built and is maintained by the state and local governments.
The federal government makes substantial expenditures for
~

education and welfare within the Reservation, including

.I

'

3.

programs in education, social

services~

housing improvement,

employment assistance, forestry, road construction and maintenance, and Indian business development.
Two separate actions were filed in the USDC (Montana)
by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes and various
members.

Each case was heard by the same three-judge dis-

trict court.

The first, from which appellees have taken a

cross-appeal (No. 75-50), involved application of Montana's
cigarette tax statutes to tribal members on the Reservation
(hereinafter "Moe").

The second, not involved in the cross-

appeal, concerned the application of Montana's personal
property tax to tribal members on the Reservation (hereinafter
, {~)

"Montana").

In Moe the cross-appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the cigarette tax statutes of the State
of Montana, R.C.M., 1947, §§ 84-5606-5606.31 and sought a
permanent injunction against their future application to them.
One of the plaintiffs below (Wheeler), who is now deceased,
was a member of the Tribes and had established retail stores
on two tracts of land within the Reservation held in trust
by the United States, where he sold cigarettes.

For the

right to sell cigarettes he paid an administrative fee to
the Tribes.

The Tribes are also authorized by their Consti-

-

tution to tax_figarette sales within the Reservation but

--.

-

not done so to date.

ve

Wheeler did not possess a state cigarette

vendor's license, and did not affix the state cigarette tax
sales stamps or precollect the state cigarette sales tax, as

4.
r equired by Montana law.

He was arre ste d for noncomplianc e

wi th the state statutes and a portion of his inventory was
conf i sc a t ed.

The tax is 12 cents on a package, 4.5 cents

of which is alloc at e d by state law to the general revenue
fund which is used f or the support of services to both
Indians and non-Indians.
The three-judge court declared the tax statutes invalid and permanently enjoined their enforcement to the
extent that they required members of the Tribes

residin~

on

the Reservation to possess state vendor's licenses and to
I

the extent they applied to cigarette sales within the Reservation by tribal members to Indians who resided within the
Reservation.

The court further .held

~

that ~ the

statutes were

valid insofar as they required tribal members to precollect
the state cigarette tax imposed on non-Indian purchasers. 1
It is this latter portion of the judgment which is the subject
of the cross-appeal.
In reaching this holding the court rejected the contention that it lacked the power to issue an injunction because of the Federal Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
In its first opinion the court found § 1341 inapplicable
under the federal instrumentality doctrine.

Appx. 77-79.

In its second opinion it recognized that the validity of

1

Four s arate opinions were issued by the three-judge
G._OU:J;:t_ in t ese cases,
~rst on
c
,
The subsequent opinions build upon the first, and the
final judgment was filed March 19, 1975.

·'··

5.
this doctrine as a basis for immunity from state taxation
with respect to Indians and Indian property was questionable
after Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 150-55
(1973), and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S.
164, 169-70 & n.5 (1974).

Appx. 43 n.9.

It thus reconsidered

this question and examined the legislative history of § 1341
and the cases decided thereunder.

Appx. 41-47.

The court

concluded from this analysis that § 1341 does not bar federal
court jurisdiction where "immunity from state taxation is
asserted on the basis of federal law with respect to persons
or entities in whieh the United States has a real and significant interest."

Id. 43.

Accordingly it found it un-

necessary to decide whether plaintiff Wheeler's business
venture was an instrumentality of the United States since
there was no doubt that the United States has a real and
significant interest in the Tribes and its members.
The three-judge court then examined the existing
jurisdictional relationships between the Tribes and Montana.
Montana had assumed complete criminal and limited civil
\

jurisdiction over the Indians residing in the Reservation
P.L. 280, 67 Stat. 588, August 15, 1953,
underkhe predecessor statute to 25 U.S.C. §§ _132Z, 1324
considered by this Court in McClanahan.

Even assuming the

validity of this assumption of jurisdiction under P.L. 280
the court reasoned that the
tax laws were civil, not criminal, in nature and that Montana's
._--..

-----

existing civil jurisdiction over the Reservation
Indians

(~

Appx. 49) did not justify the tax statutes here.

6.

It noted that under McClanahan and the prior decisions of
this Court Indian citizens living on the Reservation are
still regarded as a separate, semi-independent people, with

--

the power of regulating their internal affairs, free from
state interference.

The court thus concluded that consis-

tent with these principles Montana did not have the power
to impose a tax upon cigarette sales between Tribe members
on the Reservation

or require a Tribe member who sells

cigarettes on the Reservation to obtain a dealer's license.
The court reached an oeposite_ conclusion with respect
to the pre-collection of cigarette excise taxes relating to
sales to non-Indians.

In reaching this conclusion the court

--0

first cited the state statutory provision which indicated

~

that the cigarette taxes were conclusively presumed to be
a direct sales tax on the retail customer, pre-collected
for the purpose of convenience only.

Under this system

~~

the seller pays the tax to the wholesaler and adds the cost
to the purchase price of the cigarettes.

__/

The court then

considered the many decisions of this Court concerning the
power of the states over Indians, finding none controlling.
It noted, for example, that this was not a case like Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 380 U.S. 685 (1965),
where a licensed trader established a store for the benefit
of Indians residing on the Reservation.

These stores were

located on U. S. Highway 93 and the court considered it a
reasonable inference that the stores had not been established
primarily for the benefit of Indians residing on the Reservation

•'

.. '

I·'

7.

but instead were intended to sell cigarettes to prospective
customers passing on the highway and to residents of neighboring conununities who wished to avoid the sales tax.

The

court concluded that the tax was constitutional since collection of it by the Indian seller would not impose a tax
burden on the Indian:3 residing on the Reservation or infringe
in any way tribal self-government.

In support of this holding,

it also cited the si:nilar conclusion reached by the Supreme
Court of Washington after the remand by this Court in Tonasket
v. Washington, 411
McClanahan.

u.s.

451 (1973), for consideration of

The Washington Supreme Court had concluded that

McClanahan did not mandate the conclusion that a state could
not impose a cigarette excise tax on sales to non-Indians on
the Reservation.

525 P.2d 744.

The three-judge court thus

rejected the holding of the Supreme Court of Idaho in Mahoney
v. State of Idaho Tax Comm'n., 524 P.2d 187 (1974), cert.

u.s.

denied,

(1974), that the Idaho Tax Commission

had "no jurisdiction to tax the on-reservation sale of cigarettes by an Indian seller whether the purchasers were
Indians or non-Indians."
Although agreeing that the court had jurisdiction, the
Moe dissent said that the majority opinion accomplished a constitutionally suspect discrimination in favor in Indians
neither mandated by treaty or Act of Congress.

The dissent

disagreed with this Court's construction of the Buck Act in
McClanahan
to
------....... ··--

the effect that § 109 of the Act evidenced a

Congressional intent to maintain the tax exempt status of

8.
Indians. Appx. 30.

It then reasoned that if McClanahan were

based on implica tion of tax exemption rather than on lack
of jurisdiction it would have no difficulty distinguishing
the situation here except with respect to sales on trust
lands.

Unlike the Navajos in McClanahan the Tribes here

had no tradition of sovereignty until after the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 when tribal courts were created
for the first

ti(1'f-/~~~)

In Montana the appellees sought (1) a judgment de-

"'

claring unconstitutional as applied to them Montana statutes
providing for the

a ~;sessment

and collection of state personal

property taxes
generally, and in particular,of personal
......._.,
property taxes on motor vehicles, (2) an injunction against
the statutes' enforcement, and (3) a refund of personal
property taxes paid to the date of the court's final judgment.
In its opinion the three-judge court emphasized that the
appellees did not challenge the state's vehicle registration
fee which is used for the construction and maintenance of
roads.

They challenged only the motor vehicle property tax

which is not a designated road tax and is used instead for
general governmental purposes as are other personal property
taxes.

Relying on its decision in Moe the court held the

challenged statutes unconstitutional insofar as they required
the payment of a motor vehicle tax and other personal taxes
by members of the Tribes residing on the reservations.
McClanahan again was regarded as controlling.

As in Moe the

court reserved consideration of all further issues pending

'.
•

.1·

9.
final determination of the unconstitutionality of the
statute.
The dissent objected to the judgment insofar as it
declared unconstitutional R.C.M. § 53-114 which conditions
the issuance of a license on the payment of property and
license taxes.

The dissent reasoned that although the holding

in Moe mandated that the Reservation be considered a taxfree sanctuary, thi:3 should not prevent the state from requiring Indians to pay for the right to drive on off-reservation highways and the right to the protection afforded by
the off-reservation machinery of the Registrar of Motor
Vehicles.

3.

\..

Contentions:

The appellants' (No. 74-1656) first

contention is that the immunity from state taxation granted
to the Indians of the Flathead Reservation is a racial discrimination in favor of Indians and against non-Indian
citizens repugnant to fundamental principles of equal protection and due process.

Appellants cite a host of due

process and equal protection cases,

~'

Loving v. Virginia,

388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1954), in support of the proposition that the three-judge
court decision forces Montana to engage in invidious
discrimination based on race.
Appellants' second contention is that the immunity
from taxation afforded the Flathead Reservation Indians is
contrary to section 349 of the General Allotment Act, 25

§ 349, and related legislation.

u.s.c.

Appellants cite the language

10.
of section 349 which provides that at 'the termination of the
trust per iod provided for in the Act the land was to be conveyed to the Indian in fee and the allottee "shall have the
benefit of and be. subject to the laws, both civil and criminal
of the state or territory" in which he resided.

Appellants

recognize that the General Allotment Act became "inoperative"
after the Indian Reorganization Act of

~934,

48 Stat. 984,

but contend that it has not specifically been repudiated and
is consistent with other federal legislation against
discrimination.
Appellants' third contention is that the three-judge
court relied on the federal instrumentality doctrine to
establish jurisdiction here in the face of the § 1341 prohibition and that this is contrary to Mescalero and McClanahan.
'

Appellants also contend that since jurisdiction over the
action of the individual tribal members was upheld under
28 U.S.C. § 1343, this decision is in conflict with American
Commuters Assoc., Inc. v. Levitt, 405 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1969),
and Bland v. McRann, 463 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 966 (1973), holding that allegations of deprivations
of civil rights involved in collection of taxes do not permit
an exception to the § 1341 prohibition.
In response appellees (No. 74-1656) in part cite the
Treaty of Hell Gate which reserved for the "exclusive use and
benefit" of the Salish and Kootenai Tribes the land encompassed
\

by the Flathead Reservation and also the Montana Enabling Act
'

of February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, 677, which required the

'·,

11.

state to disclaim all right and title 'to the Indian lands
within its borders.

They argue that there is no significant

difference between the Flathead Reservation and the Navajo
Reservation in McClanahan.

Since there is no distinction

between the taxes here and the income tax in McClanahan, the
outcomes must be th<2 same.
The cross-appellants (No. 75-50) contend that although
the three-judge court correctly recognized that the Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959), test-- state laws are invalid when they reach the point of interfering with tribal
self-government

is applicable here, they misapplied it.

The pre-collection of taxes with respect to sales to nonIndians interferes with

·~ibal

self-government since the

Tribes are inhibited from exercising their tribal constitutional authority to impose a tax on the merchandise because the tribal retailers would then be placed at a competitive disadvantage.
source of revenue.

The Tribes are precluded from this

Moreover, the three-judge court's decision

is contrary to Warren Trading Post.

Finally, cross-appellants

contend that here, as in McClanahan, Montana has not assumed
general jurisdiction over tribal members on the Reservation
and there is no way the state can enforce the tax laws in
question.

Jurisdiction is the power to compel and the state

lacks that power here.

See 411 U.S. at 178-79.

Cross-appellees argue that the retail outlets were

\. .. ·

operated by individual Indians, not the Tribes.

Cross-appellants

are not comparable to the licensed traders in Warren Trading

12.
Post.

The tax is not upon the Indian seller, but the ulti-

mate purchaser.

There is in fact no requirement that the

Indian seller prepay the tax to the wholesaler when he purchases cigarettes for resale.

Sales to non-Indians without

collection of the tax invites violation of criminal law by
the non-Indian purchaser.

R.S.M. § 84-5608.18 (1947).

No

decision of this Court suggests that such a result would
find judicial acceptance.
4.

Discussion:

Despite the demise of the federal

instrumentality doctrine as a reason for insulating Indian
affairs from state tax laws,

~Mescalero

Apache Tribe v.

Jones, supra, at 150 and cases cited therein, an exception
to the § 1341 prohibition for actions brought by Indians
appears reasonable in light of the special federal interest
in their affairs.

The three-judge court indicated that the

legislative history of § 1341 demonstrated that it was intended to eliminate the disparity between the rights afforded
citizens of a state, and nonresidents and foreign corporations who because of diversity jurisdiction were able to
obtain injunctions in federal courts.
not be affected by the result here.

This purpose would
The test of a "real and

significant" federal interest in the particular group affected
is perhaps too broad, however, since such an exception might
arguably apply to any class of persons which the Congress has
protected by statute.

But see Bland v. McRann, supra at 24-25

(allegations of deprivations of civil rights involved in tax
collections does not provide an exception to§ 1341 prohibition).

13.
Ass wning that the three-judge c'ourt had jurisdiction
then insofar as it held the Montana tax statutes unconstitutionalJ the result appears correct under Warren Trading
Post, McClanahan, Williams, and the other decisions of this
Court in this area.

Bu~

despite the fact (1) the cigarette

tax was upon the final purchaser, not the Indian seller,
(2) the stores were located so as to attract non-Indian
business, and (3) the cigarettes are in no way connected
with reservation production or manufacture, the holding that
the cigarette excise tax with respect to sales on the Flat.
. constltutlona
.
.
1 lS
. quesh ea d Reservatlon
to non- I n d'lans lS

tionable.

~

This is particularly so because the cross-appellants

assert that the state has not validly asswned general jurisdiction over the tribal members on the Reservation and con~~~

sequently, as in McClanahan, it does notAhave the jurisdiction necessary to enforce the tax.

The three-judge court

did not deal with this question. In its anlaysis of the
tax or; cigarette
validity of the sales to Indians on the Flathead Reservation
/\
it asswned, arguendo, that the state had validly asswned complete criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over the Indians
residing there.

It then concluded that, even though subject

to being enforced by criminal statutes, the taxing statutes
were civil in nature, and that the prior limited asswnption
of civil jurisdiction did not support the taxing statutes here.
The appellees in both the main appeal and the cross-appeal
have filed motions to affinn.
August 12, 1975
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October 31, 1975 Conference
List 3, Sheet 4
(No. 74-1656 \
MOE

Joint Motion to Dispense
with Printing Appendix
and to Proceed on Original
Record

v.
CONFEDERATED SALISH
AND KOOTENAI TRIBES
No.

75-~

CONFEDERATEDSALffiH
AND KOOTENAI TRIBES

v.
MOE
On October 6, the Court consolidated and noted probable jurisdiction in
these appeals from a 3-J USDC (Montana) decision involving state taxation of
cigarette sales made on a reservation and of personal property of Indians who
reside on the reservation.

- 2 ·-

Both sets of par ti es now move, pursuant . to Rule 36(8), for leave to
disp ense with the re q uire ment of an appendix and to permit the cases to be
heard on the original record.
(

T he parties urge that the only matter relevant

for printing in an appendix- -opinions, memoranda and judgments--have already

\ been printed in the Jurisdictional Shtements.

Counsel also advise that in light

of the Court 1 s action noting pr obable jurisdiction they under stand that they need
not further address any issue as to the Court 1 s jurisdiction and.1 accordingly,
that no pleadings filed below concerning jurisdiction or the convening of a 3-J
Court would be relevant so as to merit printing in the appendix.
DISCUSSION: It is not clear what counsel intend by their last statement.
However 1 for purposes of the motion.1 it does not appear that any pleadings filed
below would bear on the 28 U.S. C. 1341 (Tax Injunction Act) jurisdictional que s(

tion.

In any event, the pleadings would be available in the record.
The Court has been liberal in granting motions to dispense with an

appendix on the

gr~mnds

given by the parties.

There is no resp onse.
l0/21/75
PJN
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No. 75-50
I

Joint Motion to Dispense
with Printing Appendix
and to Proceed on Original
Record
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I

''--

v.
MOE
See Memorandum in Noo 74-1656.
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John C. Moe, etc., et al.,
Appellants,
74-1656
v,
r,I'he Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes of
the Flathead Reserva- On Appeals from the United
tion et al.
States District Court for
the District of Montana,
The Confederated Salish
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and Kootenai Tribes of
the Flathead Reservation et al., Appellants,
75- 50
v.
John C. Moe, etc., et al.
[April -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We are called upon in these appeals to resolve several
questions arising out of a conflict between the asserted
taxing power of the State of Montana and the immunity
claimed by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
(Tribe) and its members living on the tribal reservation.
Convened as a three-judge court/ the District Court for
the District of Montana considered separate attacks on
the State's cigarette sales and personal property taxes as
applied to reservation Indians. After finding that the
suits were not barred by the prohibition of 28 U. S. C.
1
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See 28 U. S. C. § 2281.
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§ 1341/ the District Court entered final judgments which,

with one exception, sustained the Tribe's challenges, and
from which the State has appealed (No. 74-1656). The
Tribe has cross-appealed from that part of the judgment
upholding tax jurisdiction over on-reservation sales of
cigarettes by members of the Tribe to non-Indians. We
noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 and
consolidated the appeal and cross-appeal. 3 -U.S.--.
(1976). Concluding that the District Court had the
power to grant injunctive relief in favor of the Tribe, and
that it was correct on the merits, we affirm in both cases,

~.

~

I
In 1855 an expfnse of land stretching across the Bitter
Root River Valley and within the then Territory of
Washington was reserved for "the use and occupation"
of the "confederated tribes of the Flathead, Kootenay,
and Upper Pend d'Oreilles Indians," by the Treaty of
Hell Gate, which in 1859 was ratified by the Senate and
proclaimed by President Buchanan.
12 Stat. 975.
Slightly over half of its 1.25 million acres is now owned
in fee, by both Indians and non-Indians; most of the
remaining half is held in trust by the United States for
the Tribe. Approximately 50% of the Tribe's current
membership of 5,749 reside on the reservation and in
turn comprise 19% of the total reservation population.
Embracing portions of four Montana counties-Lake,
Sanders, Missoula, and Flathead-the present reservation was generally described by the District Court:
"The Flathead Reservation is a well-developed

-.

·.

See Part II, infra, for the discussion of the jurisdictional
' question.
3 For ease of reference, the various parties involved in the appeal
and cross-appeal will be referred to simply as the State and the:
T.rihe, except as otherwise noted.
2

.
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agricultural area with farms, ranches and communities scattered throughout the inhabited portions of
the Reservation. While some towns have predominantly Indian sectors, generally Indians and nonIndians live together in integrated communities.
Banks, businesses and professions on the Reservation provide services to Indians and non-Indians
alike.
"As Montana citizens, members of the Tribe are
eligible to vote and do vote in city, county and state
elections. Some hold elective and appointed state
and local offices. All services provided by the state
and local governments are equally available to Indians and non-Indians. The only schools on the
Reservation are those operated by school districts
of the State of Montana. The State and local governments have built and maintain a system of state
highways, county roads and streets on the Reservation which are used by Indians and non-Indians
without restriction." 392 F . Supp. 1297, 1313'
(Mont. 1975) .
Joseph Wheeler, a member of the Tribe, leased from it
two tracts of trust land within the reservation whereon
he operated retail "smoke shops." Deputy sheriffs arrested Wheeler and an Indian employee for failure to·
possess a cigarette retailer's license and for selling non-·
tax-stamped cigarettes, both misdemeanors under Montana law. These individuals, joined by the Tribe and
the tribal chairmen, then sued 4 in the District Court
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State's
cigarette tax and· vendor licensing statutes as applied to·
The defendants-appellants in the cigarette tax case are Montana 's Department of Revenue, its director, and the sheriffs of the
counties m which the "smoke shops" were located No monetary
relief has been sought in this action.
4

'.
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tribal members who sold cigarettes within the reservation.6 That court by a divided vote held that our decision in McClanahan v. Arizona State 'Tax Comm'n, 411
U. S. 164 (1973), barred Montana's efforts to impose its
cigarette tax statutes on the Tribe's retail cigarette sales
with one exception: it may require a precollection of the
tax imposed ·by law upon the non-Indian purchaser of
the cigarettes.6
In a later action, the Tribe and four enrolled members,
all residents of the reservation, challenged 7 Montana's
~ Suit was brought shortly after the arrests. The record does not
indicate whether criminal proceedings were instituted in state court,
and in any case the State has made no claim as to the propriety of
the District Court's entry of relief under Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S.
:37 ( 1971), and related decisions from this Court.
6 The District Court noted that the State's present statutory
scheme contemplates advance payment or "precollection" of the
sales tax by the retailer when he purchases his inventory from the
wholesaler. Recognizing that its holding-a distinction between
sales to Indians and to non-Indians-would result in "complicated
problems" of enforcement by the State, the District Court deferred
passing on these problems pending a decision by this Court. We of
course express no opinion on this question.
7 Named as defendants were various county officials, the State's
Department of Revenue and its director, and the State itself. In
contrast to the cigarette tax case, however, the plaintiffs, suing as
representatives of all other members of the Tribe residing on the
reservation, demanded a refund of personal property taxes paid to
the date of the District Court's final judgment. In the opinion accompanying the District Court's judgment entering the requested
declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the Tribe and the
individual Indians, it stated that "any further questions" were reserved pending this Court's final determination of the constitutiOnality of the personal property tax statutes. The questions, then, of
whether and to what extent the District Court would have subjectmatter jurisdiction over claims for refunds, at the behest of the
Tribe or its members, are not before us, and we leave them for the
trial court to determine in the first instance. For example, any acti!)n b~sed. Qn 28 U. S C. ~ 1331 must comply with 1ts $10,000 lnnita-
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statutory scheme for assessment and collection of personal property taxes, in particular the imposition of such
taxes on motor vehicles owned by tribal members residing on the reservation. 8 The District Court, again by a
divided vote, found its earlier decision interpreting McClanahan controlling in the Tribe's favor. While recognizing, as did the Tribe, that a fee required for registration and issuance of state license plates for a motor
vehicle could be exacted from Indians residing on the
reservation, 9 the Court held that the additional personal
property tax which was likewise made a condition precedent for lawful registration of the vehicle could not be
imposed on reservation Indians.
II
The important threshold question in both cases is
whether the District Court was prohibited from entering
juri.sdiction over these suits to restrain Montana's taxing
authority, inasmuch as Congress has provided that
"[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
tion, with the corollary rule that "multiple plaintiffs with separate
and distinct claims must each satisfy the jurisdictional-amount requirement for suit in the federal courts." Zahn v. International
Paper Co ., 414 U. S. 291, 294 (1973) . The present record, understandably, does not reflect the dollar amount involved.
8 The Tribe and the individual members had earlier filed an identical attack against Montana's personal income tax as applied to income earned by tribal members on the reservation. Shortly after
this Court's decision in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra,
the State stipulated that McClanahan barred its taxing jurisdiction
in this respect and agreed to cease voluntarily its collection efforts
and make refunds. Relying on this settlement, the Tribe thereafter
requested the State's attorney general to order a similar cessation
with respect to personal property taxes. Advised that its request
was rejected, the Tribe instituted this action.
9 The tribe has from the beginning expressly disclaimed any immunity from this nondiscriminatory vehicle registration fee.

.•
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restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any
tax under State law where a plain, speedy and effi.,
cient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State." 28 U. S. C. § 1341.
;By enacting this jurisdictional rule, Congress gave e~
plicit sanction to the pre-existing federal equity practice :
pecause interference with a "State's in,_ternal economy is
inseparable from a federal action to restrain state
taxation,
"'the mere illegality or unconstitutionality of a
state .. . tax is not in itself a ground for equitable
relief in the courts of the United States. If the
remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete, the
aggrieved party is left to that remedy in the state
courts, from which the cause may be brought to this
Court for review if any federal question is involved.'
Matthews v. Rodgers, [284 U. S. 521, 525-526
(1932)]." 'Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S.
293, 298 (1943).

...
{

'.

This broad jurisdictional barrier, however, has been
held by this Court to be inapplicable to suits brought by
the United States "to protect itself and its instrumen. . talities from unconstitutional state extactions." Depart..
ment of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355, 358
10
l (1966).
The District Court, citing Department of Employment
·and cases from other courts, concluded that
" [w]hile the exceptions to § 1341 have been expressed most often in terms of the Federal instrumentality doctrine, we do not view the exceptions:
10 There the United' States sought injunctive relief against certain
state taxation of its coplaintiff, the American National Red Cross,
which on the merits this Court held was immune from same as a.
federal instrumentality.

'·
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as limited to cases where the doctrine is clearly applicable. It seems clear [that § 1341] does not bar
federal court jurisdiction in cases where immunity
from state taxation is asserted on the basis of federal
law with respect to persons or entities in which the
United States has a real and significant interest."
392 F. Supp., at 1303 (emphasis added) .
In its brief Montana argues that any r:eliance on the
federal instrumentality doctrine, either as such or as
expanded by the District Court, for purposes of finding
jurisdiction in these cases is contrary to the substantive
decisions from this Court which "cut to the bone the
proposition that restricted Indian lands and the proceeds
from them were-as a matter of constitutional lawautomatically exempt from state taxation." Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 150 (1973). See
McClanahan, supra, at 170 n. 5; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
v. Texas Co., 336 U. S. 342 (1949); Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598 (1943) .
We have indeed recently declined "the invitation to
resurrect the expansion version of the intergovernmentalimmunity doctrine that has been so consistently rejected"
in this kind of case. Mescalero, supra, at 155. While
the concept of a federal instrumentality may well have
greater usefulness in determining the applicability of
§ 1341, Department of Employment v. United States,.
supra, than in providing the touchstone for deciding·
whether or not Indian tribes may be taxed, Mescalero, .
supra, we do not believe that the District Court's expanded version of this doctrine, quoted above, can by·
itself avoid the bar of § 1341.
The District Court, however, also relied on a more
recent Jurisdictional statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1362, whicru
prov1des:
1
'The district courts shall have original l urisdict.iotl!

•.
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of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or
band with a governing body duly recognized by the
Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the . Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." Oct. 10, 1966, Pub.
L. 89-635, § 1, 80 Stat. 880.
Sections 1341 and 1362 do not cross-reference each
other. Since presumably all actions properly within the
jurisdiction of the United States District Courts are authorized by one or another of the statutes conferring
jurisdiction upon those courts, the mere fact that a ·jurisdictional statute such as § 1362 speaks in general terms
of "all" enumerated civil actions docs not itself signify
that Indian tribes are exempted from the provisions of
§ 1341.11

Looking to the legislative history of § 1362 for whatever light it may shed on the question, we find an indication of a congressional purpose to open the federa1
courts to the kind of claims that could have been brought
by the United States as trustee, but for whatever reason
were not so brought. Section 1362 is characterized by
the reporting House Judiciary Committee as providing
"the means whereby the tribes are assured of the same
judicial determination whether the action is brought in
their behalf by the Government or by their own attorneys." 12 While this is hardly an unequivocal statement
of intent to allow such litigation to proceed irrespective
of other explicit jurisdictional limitations, such as § 1341,
it would appear that Congress contemplated that a tribe's
access to federal court to litigate a matter arising "under
11

Section 1341 itself, of course, includes a proviso that the remedy
in state court must be "plain, speedy and efficient." The Tribe does
not cla1m that it would not have had such a remedy under Montana
Jaw
12 H. R Rep No . 2040, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1966).

.·
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the Constitution, laws, and treaties" would be at least \n
some respects as broad as that of the United States suing
as the tribe's trustee.
That the United States could have brought these
actwns, by itself or as coplaintiff, seems reasonably clear.
In Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 (1912), the
United States sued to cancel numerous conveyances by
Cherokee allotees-grantors, who were not parties, as violative of federal restrictions upon the Indians' power of
alienation. In the course of concluding that the United
States had the requisite interest in enforcing these restrictions for the Indians' benefit, the Court discussed
United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903), which
upheld the right of the Government to seek injunctive
relief against county taxation directed at improvements
on and tools used to cultivate land allotted to and occupied by the Sioux Indians. Of Rickert, the Court in
lleckman stated:
"But the decision [that the United States had the
requisite interest] rested upon a broader foundation
than the mere holding of a legal title to land in
trust, and embraced the recognition of the interest
of the United States in securing immunity to the
Indians from taxation conflicting with the measures·.
it had adopted for their protection." I d., 224 U. S.,.
at 441 .
Here the United States could have made the same·
attack on Montana's assertion of taxing power as was in.
fact made by the Tribe, Heckman v. United States,
supra. 13 We think the legislative history of § 1362,

..

""":.

13

Heckman and Rickert were both cases in which the protection
asserted by the United States on behalf of the Indians was grounded
in the federal instrumentality doctrine. Since Mescalero, as we·
have noted, effectively eliminated that doctrine as a basis for immunizing Indians frulDl Rtate taxation, there might appear to be .a..

....
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though by no means dispositive, suggests that in certain
respects tribes suing under this section were to be accorded treatment similar to that of the United States
had it sued on their behalf. Since th,e United States is
not barred by § 1341 from seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a state tax law, Department of Employment v.
United States, supra, we h~ld that the· 'Tribe is not
barred from doing so in this case.14
certain inconsistency in our reliance on Heckman. But the question
· of whether the United St_ates has standing (Heckman used the
term "capacity") to sue on behalf of others is analytically distinct
from the question of whether the substantive theory on which .. it
relies will prevail, and each is in turn separate from whether · injunctive relief can issue at the United States' behest irrespective of
§ 1341. Depa-rtment of Employment, see text and n. 10, supra, 'did
not hold that the United States had standing only in actions falling
within the federal instrumentality doctrine. Cases in the lower
federal courts cited therein (385 U. S., at 358 n. 6), e. g., Unitei!
States v. Arlington County, Commonwealth of Virginia, 326 F. 2d
929, 931-933 (CA4 1964), and other cases from this Court, see In
re Debs, 158 U. S. 56( 584 (1895); United States v. San Jacinto
Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 284-286 (1888), indicate otherwise. The
proper basis for the protection asserted here, of course, is not the·
federal instrumentality doctrine eschewed in ·Mescalero, but is that
which McClanahan identified, i. e., that state taxing jurisdiction has
been pre-empted by the applicable treaties and federal legislation.
While not d'eciding what limits there are upon the Uriited States•·
standmg to sue absent enabling legislation, we conclude that the
relationship between the United States and the Tribe-grounded in
the Hell Gate Treaty an·d a century of subsequent legislationwould have established the former's standing to raise the pre~emp
tion claim on behalf of the latter, and that an injuhctive remedy
to enforce that claim would not have been barred by § 1341.
14 The District Court went on to find jurisdiction over the indi·
vidual Indian plamtiffs in 'both actions on the basis of 28 U. S. C.
§ 1343 (3), together with their allegation that these taxes deprived
them of a right secured by the Commerce Clause. Noting that
§ 1362 by its terms goes only to an "Indian tribe or band," the
State has argued that to hold § 1341 inapplicable merely because·
<1;}.1J'1 state tax is attacked. QJl constitutional grounds virtually strips 1t

...•,
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III
In McClanahan this Court considered the question
whether the State had the power to tax a reservation
Indian, a Navajo, for income earned exclusively on the
reservation. We there looked to the language of the
Navajo treaty and the applicable federal statutes "which
define the limits of state power." I d., at 172. Reading
them against the "backdrop" of the Indian sovereignty
doctrine, the Court concluded "that Arizona ha[d] ex..
ceeded its lawful authority" by imposing the tax at issue.
ld., at 173. In Mescalero, the companion case, the im..
port of McClanahan was summarized:
"[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for
taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income
from activities carried on within the boundaries of
the reservation, and McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, supra, lays to rest any do~bt in this respect
by holding that such taxation is not permissible
absent congressional consent." 411 U. S., at 148.
Aligning itself with the dissenting opinion below, the
State first seeks to avoid McClanahan on two grounds:
(1) the manner in which the Flathead Reservation has
of force and is contrary to other federal court decisions: Bland v.
McRann, 463 F. 2d 21 (CA5 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 966
(1973); American Commuters Assn., Inc . v. Levitt, 405 F. 2d 1148
(CA2 1969). Cf. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538,
542 n. 6 (1972) The Tribe's brief does not discuss this aspect of the
District Court's holding. We need not decide this question, however, since all of the substantive issues raised on appeal can be
reached by deciding the claims of the Tribe alone, which did bring
this action in the District C<Jurt under § 1362. Cf. California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 D. S. 21 (1974). Any further proceeding~J
with respect to refund claims by individual Indians, see n . 1, supra.,
·woulit not appear to implicate.§ 1341.

',
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developed to its present state distinguishes it from the
Navajo Reservation; (2) there does exist a federal statutory basis permitting Montana to tax.
The State pointed below to a variety of factors: reservation Indians benefitted from expenditures of state revenues for education, welfare, and other services, such as a
sewer system; the Indians had the right to vote and to
hold local and state office; and the Iridian and non-Indian
residents within the reservation were substantially integrated as a business and social community. The District
Court also found, however, that the Federal Government
"likewise made substantial payments for various purposes," and that the Tribe's own income contributed
significantly to its economic well-being. 392 F. Supp., at
1314. Noting this Court's rejection of a substantially
identical argument in McClanahan, see 411 U.S., at 173
& n. 12, and the fact that the Tribe, like the Navajo,
had not abandoned its tribal organization, the District
Court could not accept the State's proposition that the
tribal members "are now so completely integrated with
the non-Indians ... that there is no longer any reason
to accord them different treatment than other citizens."
392 F. Supp., at 1315. In view of the District Court's
findings, we agree that there is no basis for distinguishing
McClanahan on this ground.
As to the second ground, we note that the State does
not challenge the District Court's overall conclusion that
the treaty and statutes upon which the Tribe relies in
asserting the lack of state taxing authority "are essentia]ly the same as those involved in McClanahan." •s

.'

The quote is taken from the first (unpublished) opinion of the·
District Court, the conclusions of which with respect to McClanahan
were reaffirmed m the later opm10ns filed May 10, 1974, Feb. 4,.
1975, and Mar. 19, 1975, published at 392 F. Supp. 1297 & 1325..
ClVll No 2145 (Mont., filed Oct. 10, 1973), reproduced in the:
States .h~risdirtl.onal Statement , Appendix, at 81 , n 9"
16

',
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We agree, and it would serve no purpose to retrace our
analysis in this respect in McClanahan, 411 U.S., at 173179. The State instead argues that the District Court
failed to properly consider the effect of the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, and a later enactment
in 1904, 33 Stat. 302, applying that Act to the Flathead
Reservation. Section 6 of the General Allotment Act, 24
Stat. 390, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 349, provides in part :
" At the expiration of the trust period and when
the lands have been conveyed to the Indians by
patent in fee . .. then each and every allottee shall
have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both
civil and criminal, of the State or 'Territory in which
they reside ...."
The State relies on Goudy v. Meath, 203 U. S. 146
(1906), where the Court, applying the above section,
rejected the claim of an Indian patentee thereunder that
state taxing jurisdiction was not among the "laws" to
which he and his land had been made subject. Building
on Goudy and the fact that the General Allotment Act
has never been explicitly "repealed," the State claims
that Congress has never intended to withdraw Montana's
taxing jurisdiction, and that such power continues to the
present.
We find the argument untenable for several reasons.
By its terms it does not reach Indians residing or preclueing income from lands held in trust for the Tribe,
which make up about one-half of the land area of the
reservation. If the General Allotment Act itself establishes Montana's jurisdiction as to those Indians living·
on "fee patented" lands, then for all jurisdictional purposes-civil and criminal-the Flathead Reservation has
been substantially diminished in size. A similar claim
was made by the State in Seymour v. Superintendent,.
· Zf68 U. S. 351 (1962), to which we responded :
'"~[the 1 argument rests upon the fact that where the'

··.
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existence or nonexistence of an Indian reservation,
and therefore the existence or nonexistence of fedrral jurisdiction, depends upon the ownership of
particular parcels of land, law enforcement officers
operating in the area will find it necessary to search
tract books in order to determine whether criminal
jurisdiction over each particular offense, even though
committed within the reservation, is in the State or
Federal Government." !d., at 358.

·''

We concluded that "[s]uch an impractical pattern of
checkerboard jurisdiction," id., was contrary to the intent
embodied in the existing federal statutory law of Indian
jurisdiction. See also United States v. Mazurie, 419
u.s. 544, 554-555 (1975).
The State's argument also overlooks what this Court
has recently said of the present effect of the General
Allotment Act and related legislation of that era:
"Its policy was to continue the reservation system
and the trust status of Indian lands, but to allot
tracts to individual Indians for agriculture and grazing. When all the lands had been allotted and the
trust expired, the reservation could be abolished.
Unallotted lands were made available to non-Indians
with the purpose, in part, of promoting interaction
between the races and of encoura.ging the Indians
to adopt white ways. See § 6 of the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 390; [citation omitted]. The
policy of allotment and sale of surplus reservation
land was repudiated in 1934 by the Indian ReorganizatiOn Act, 48 Stat. 984, now amended and codified
as 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq." Mattz v. Arnett, 412
U S. 481, 496 (1973) (part of footnote 18 incorporated mto t,ext ).

The State has 11eferred us to no decisional authorityand wr know of none-giving the meaning for which it

'·
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contends to § 6 of the General Allotment Act in the face
of the many and complex intervening jurisdictional statutes directed at the reach of state law within reservation
lands-statutes discussed, for example, in McClanahan,
411 U. S., at 173-179. See also Kennerly v. District
Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971). Congress by
its more modern legislation has evinced a clear intent to
eschew any such "checkerboard" approach within an
existing Indian reservation, and our cases have in turn
followed Congress' lead in this area.
A second, discrete claim advanced by the State is that.
the tax immunity extended by the District Court in
applying federal law constitutes an invidious discrimination against non-Indians on the basis of race, contrary
to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It
is said that the Federal Government has forced this
·racially-based exemption onto Montana so as to create·
a state statutory classification violative of the latter's
duty under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-·
teenth Amendment.
We need not dwell at length on this constitutional
argument, for assuming that the State has standing to•
raise 1t on behalf of its non-Indian citizens and taxpayers,
we think it is foreclosed by our recent decision in Morton
·v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974) . In reviewing the·
variety of statutes and decisions according special treat_m ent to Indian tribes and reservations, we stated, 417
U.S., at 552-555 :
" Literally every piece of legislation dealing with
Indian tribes and reservations ... single [s] out for
special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians
living on or near reservations. If these laws, detived from historical relationships and explicitly de~
Signed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious
raCial discrimination, an entire Title of the United
States Codf' (25 U. S. C.) would be effective]£·
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erased and the sol.emn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.
"On numerous occasions this Court specifically has
upheld legislation that singles out · Indians for par..
ticular and special treatment."
The test to be applied to these kinds of statutory prefer..
ences, which we said were neither "invidious" nor "racial"
in character, governs here:
"As long as the special treatment can ·be tied -ra..
tionally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obJi..
gation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments
will not be disturbed." I d., at 555.
For these reasons, the personal property tax on per..
sonal property located within the reservation; the vendor
license fee sought to be applied to a reservation Indian
conducting a cigarette business for the Tribe on reservation land; and the cigarette sales tax, as applied to on. reservation sales by Indians to Indians/ 6 conflict with
the congressional statutes which provide the basis for
demsion with respect to such impositions. McClanahan,
supra; Mescalero, supra.11
16 The District Court noted two further distinctions within its
ruling. It extended its holding to sales of cigarettes to Indians
living on the Flathead Reservation irrespective of their actual membership in the plaintiff Tribe. The State has not challenged this·
holding, and we therefore do not disturb it. Secondly, while recognizing that different rules may apply "where Indians have left the
reservation and become assimilated into the general community,"
McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 171, the District Court on the present
record did not decide whether the cigarette sales tax would apply to
· on-reservation sales to Indians who resided off the Flathead Reservation. That question, too, is therefore not before us.
1 7 It is thus clear that the basis for the mvalidity of these taxing
measures, which we have found to be inconsistent with existing federal statutes, is the Supremacy Clause, U S Const ., Art.. VI , Cl. 2.
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IV
The Tribe would carry these cases significantly further
than we have done, however, and urges that the State
cannot impose its cigarette tax on sales by Indians to
non-Indians because "[i]n simple terms, [the Indian retailer] has been taxed, and ... has suffered a measurable
out-of-pocket loss." But this claim ignores the District
Court's finding that "it is the non-Indian consumer or
user who saves the tax and reaps the benefit of the tax
exemption." 392 F. Supp., at 1308. That finding necessarily follows from the Montana statute, which provides
that the cigarette tax "shall be conclusively presumed to
be [a] direct [tax] on the retail consumer precollected for
the purpose of convenience and facility only." 18 Since
nonpayment of the tax is a misqemeanor as to the retail
purchaser, 111 the competitive advantage which the Indian
seller doing business on tribal land enjoys over all other
cigarette retailers, within and without the reservation, is
dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the
tax. Without the simple expedient of having the retailer collect the sales tax from non-Indian purchasers, it
and not any automatic exemptions "as a matter of constitutional law"
either under the Commerce Clause or the intergovernmental-immunity doctrine as laid down originally in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316 (1819) . If so, then the basis for convening a threejudge cotlrt ln this type of case has effectively disappeared, for this
Court has expressly held that attacks on state statutes raising only
Supremacy Clause invalidity do not fall within the scope of 2S
U . S. C. § 2281. Swift & Co . v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965) .
Here, however, the District Court properly convened a § 2281 court,
because at the outset the Tribe's attack asserted unconstitutionality
of these statutes under the Commerce Clause, a not-insubstantial
claim since Mescalero and McClanahan had not yet been decided.
See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512 (1973) .
~s Mont . Rev. Codes Ann . § 84-5606 (1) (1947),
19 !d., §§ 84-5606.18, 84-5606.31,
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is clear that wholesale violations of the law by the latter
class will go virtually unchecked.
The Tribe asserts that to make the Indian retailer an
"involuntary agent" for collection of taxes owed by non~
Indians is a "gross interference with [its] freedom from
state regulation,)' and cites Warren Trading Post v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965), as controlling. However, that case involved a gross income tax
imposed on the on-reservation sales by the trader to resw
. ervation Indians. Unlike the sales tax here, the tax was
imposed directly on the seller, and, in contrast to the
Tribe's claim, there was in Warren no claim that the
State could not tax that portion of the receipts attributa~
ble to on-reservation sales to non-Indians. !d., 380 U.S.,
at 686 n. 1. Our conclusion in Warren that assessment
and collection of that tax ~'would to a substantial extent
frustrate the evident congressional purpose of ensuring
that no burden shall be imposed upon Indian traders for
trading with Indians on reservations," id., at 691, does
not apply to the instant case.
The State's requirement that the Indian tribal seller
collect a tax validly imposed on non-Indians is a miniiiJ.al
burden designed to avoid the likelihood that l.n its absence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal seller will
avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax. Since this
burden is not, strictly speaking, !1- tax at all, it is not
governed by the language of Mescalero, quoted supra,
·dealing with the "special area of state taxation." We
see nothing in this burden which frustrates tribal selfgovernment, see Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219-220
(1959), or runs afoul of any congressional enactment
dealing with the affairs of reservation Indians, United
States v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535, 539 (1938): "Ena!)tments of the Federal Government passed to protect and
·guard its Indian wards only affect .the operation, within

.~'
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the colony, of such state laws as conflict with the federal
enactments." See alsq Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264,
273 (1898) . We therefore agree with the District
Court that to the extent that the "smoke shops" sell to
those upon whom the State has validly imposed a sales
or excise tax with respect to the article sold, the State
may require the Indian proprietor simply to add the tax
to the sales price and thereby aid the State's collection
and enforcement thereof.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District
Court is

''·

Affirmed.
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